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a b s t r a c t
One of the main challenges in algorithmic mechanism design is to turn (existing) efficient
algorithmic solutions into efficient truthful mechanisms. Building a truthful mechanism is
indeed a difficult process since the underlying algorithmmust obey certain ‘‘monotonicity’’
properties and suitable payment functionsneed to be computed (this task usually represents
the bottleneck in the overall time complexity).
We provide a general technique for building truthful mechanisms that provide optimal
solutions in strongly polynomial time. We show that the entiremechanism can be obtained
if one is able to express/write a strongly polynomial-time algorithm (for the corresponding
optimization problem) as a ‘‘suitable combination’’ of simpler algorithms. This approach
applies to a wide class of mechanism design graph problems, where each selfish agent
corresponds to a weighted edge in a graph (the weight of the edge is the cost of using that
edge). Our technique can be applied to several optimization problems which prior results
cannot handle (e.g., MIN–MAX optimization problems).
As an application, we design the first (strongly polynomial-time) truthful mechanism
for the minimum diameter spanning tree problem, by obtaining it directly from an existing
algorithm for solving this problem. For this non-utilitarian MIN–MAX problem, no truthful
mechanismwas known, even considering those running in exponential time (indeed, exact
algorithms do not necessarily yield truthful mechanisms). Also, standard techniques for
payment computations may result in a running time which is not polynomial in the size of
the input graph. The overall running time of our mechanism, instead, is polynomial in the
number n of nodes and m of edges, and it is only a factor O(nα(n, n)) away from the best
known canonical centralized algorithm.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The emergence of the Internet as the platform for distributed computing has posed interesting questions onhow todesign
efficient solutions which account for the lack of a ‘‘central authority’’ [11,15,16]. This aspect is certainly a key ingredient for
the success of the Internet and, probably, of any ‘‘popular’’ system that one can envision (peer-to-peer systems are a notable
example of this type of anarchic systems). In their seminal works, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [11] and Nisan and Ronen
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[15], suggest a game-theoretic approach in which the various ‘‘components’’ of the system are modeled as selfish agents:
each agent performs a ‘‘strategy’’ which results in the highest utility for him/her-self. For instance, each agent may control
a link of a communication network and each link has a cost for transmitting (i.e., for using it). A protocol that wishes to
establish a minimum-cost path between two nodes would have to ask the agents for the cost of the corresponding link [15,
2]. An agent may thus find it to be in his/her interest to lie about his/her costs (e.g., an agent might untruthfully report a
very high cost in order to induce the protocol to use an alternative link, and thus no cost for the agent). Nisan and Ronen
[15] propose a mechanism design approach that combines an underlying algorithm (e.g., a shortest path algorithm) with a
suitable payment function (e.g., how much we pay an agent for using his/her link). The idea is to come up with a so called
truthfulmechanism, that is, a combination of an algorithmwith paymentswhich guarantee that no agent can improve his/her
own utility by misreporting his/her piece of private information (e.g., the cost of his/her link). Unfortunately, the design of
truthfulmechanisms is far from trivial and known results, originally developed in themicroeconomics field [20,3,5,13], pose
new algorithmic challenges which are the main subject of algorithmic mechanism design (see e.g. [4]).
Some interesting classes of problems (including a family of mechanism design graph problems considered here and in a
number of works [15,7,6,10]) require the underlying algorithm to bemonotone (e.g., if the algorithm selects an edge then it
cannot drop this edge if its cost gets smaller and everything else remains the same). Though this condition suffices for the
existence of a truthful mechanism [13,2], it is not clear how to guarantee this property nor how the corresponding payment
functions can be efficiently computed (see e.g. [9,14]).
Mu’Alem and Nisan [12] were the first to propose a general method for constructing monotone algorithms (and thus
truthful mechanisms). Basically, their approach consists of a set of ‘‘rules’’ to combinemonotone algorithms so that the final
combination results in a monotone algorithm as well. As observed by Kao et al. [10], the method in [12] does not provide an
efficient way of computing the payments. Kao et al. [10] then extend some of the techniques in [12] and provide an efficient
way for computing the corresponding payment functions. Kao et al.’s approach [10] represents a significant progress towards
a general techniquewhich accounts for computational issues, though it cannot be applied to some very basic graph problems
(e.g., a problem recently tackled in [18] — we discuss this issue more in detail below).
1.1. Our contribution
In this work, we turn one of the main results in [12] into a general technique for building optimal truthful mechanisms
running in strongly polynomial time (optimality refers to the quality of the computed solution). We show that the entire
mechanism can be obtained if one is able to express/write an algorithm (for the corresponding optimization problem) as
a ‘‘suitable combination’’ of simpler ones (see Section 2 and Theorem 1 therein). Obviously, the resulting mechanism is
optimal and/or runs in strongly polynomial time if the algorithm does. However, neither of these conditions is required
by our technique to guarantee truthfulness. This approach applies to a wide class of mechanism design graph problems,
where each selfish agent corresponds to a weighted edge in a graph (the weight of the edge is the cost of using that edge).
Our technique can deal with problems in which the cost function ‘‘underlying’’ the algorithm(s) is any monotonically non-
decreasing function in the edgeweights of the graph (i.e., in the costs of the agents). Since this includes severalnon-utilitarian1
problems (e.g., MIN–MAX optimization functions), the results in [12] extend ‘‘only partially’’, that is, truthfulness can be
guaranteed but the payments computation cannot be done ‘‘directly’’ by computing the ‘‘alternative’’ solution in which an
agent is removed from the input (see e.g. [15,9]). We indeed observe that, for the problems considered in this work (see the
discussion in Example 1), the payments computation ismore complex than the case ofmonotonically increasing optimization
functions, which are assumed in both [12] (where the problem is utilitarian) and in [10] (this assumption precedes Theorem
10 in [10] and the applications therein consist exclusively of utilitarian graph problems).
In Section 3, we apply our technique to the minimum diameter spanning tree problem and obtain the first (strongly
polynomial-time) mechanism for it. For this non-utilitarian MIN–MAX problem, no truthful mechanism was known, even
considering those running in exponential time (indeed, exact algorithms do not necessarily yield truthful mechanisms— see
Fact 1). Also, standard techniques for payment computations may result in a running time which is not polynomial in the
size of the input graph (see discussion in Example 1). The overall running time of our mechanism is instead O(mn2 α(n, n)),
and thus is only a factor O(nα(n, n)) away from the best known algorithm for this problem [8], where α(·, ·) is the classic
inverse of the Ackermann’s function. For two-edge connected graphswe also guarantee the voluntary participation condition,
that is, no truthful agent runs into a loss (see next section for a formal definition). Theminimum diameter spanning tree has
both theoretical and practical relevance (e.g., in a peer-to-peer system we may want to set up a loop-free logical network
using the resources – links – of a physical network so that any two peers can communicate efficiently).
The results for the minimum diameter spanning tree are paradigmatic of what happens when considering certain
non-utilitarian mechanism design problems (another case is the minimum radius spanning tree problem [18] described in
Example 1). First, one has to determine whether an existing algorithm can be turned into a truthful mechanism, whether
a new one is needed, or if none can serve for this purpose [15,2,18]. In case a suitable algorithm exists, one has to find
out how to compute the corresponding payments efficiently, possibly without burdening the complexity of the chosen
1 An optimization problem is called utilitarian if the goal is to minimize the sum of all agents costs or, equivalently, to maximize the sum of all agents
valuations. Utilitarian graph problems have been studied in [15,9,10].
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algorithm [9,18]. Our technique can be used to give a positive answer to both questions, and thus to obtain the efficient
mechanism in ‘‘one shot’’ (see Theorem 1). Besides that, we discuss other possible extensions and applications of our
technique in Section 4, where the concluding remarks are given.
1.2. Mechanism design graph problems
Consider problems in which we are given a graph G = (V , E) and the set of feasible outcomes consists of a suitable set
O = O(G) which depends only on the combinatorial structure of the graph (e.g., it consists of certain subgraphs of G). We
have one agent per edge and the type te ∈ R+ of agent e is nothing but theweight of edge e ∈ E. Each solution Y ∈ O uses a
subset of the edges of G; in particular, if Y uses edge e, then agent e has a cost (for implementing this outcome) equal to te.
This scenario is common to several problems considered in the algorithmic mechanism design community: shortest path
[15], minimum spanning tree [15], shortest path tree [7], minimum-radius spanning tree [18]. Consider an agent e and let
r−e denote the values reported by the other agents, that is, r−e = (r1, . . . , re−1, re+1, . . . , rm). When agent e reports x and
the other agents report r−e, algorithm A computes a feasible outcome A(x, r−e). (That is, the algorithm returns a solution
on input the vector (x, r−e) := (r1, . . . , re−1, x, re+1, . . . , rm).) We say that declaration x is a winning declaration if solution
A(x, r−e) uses edge e. A mechanism M = (A, P) associates a payment Pe(x, r−e) with every agent e whose declaration x is a
winning declaration (given the other agents’ declarations r−e). This determines the utility of agent e:
uMe (x, r−e) :=
{
Pe(x, r−e)− te if A(x, r−e) uses e,
0 otherwise.
Mechanism M is a truthfulmechanism (with dominant strategies) if every function uMe (x, r−e) is maximized for x = te, for
all r−e. We are interested in truthful mechanisms which optimize some objective function µ(Y , t) depending on the agents
types t = (t1, . . . , tm). Notice that the mechanism will work on the reported types r. Hence, truthfulness guarantees that,
if the algorithm returns an optimal solution for the given input, then the mechanism outputs an optimal solution w.r.t. the
true types.Wewill also considermechanismswhich satisfy the voluntary participation, that is, a truthful agent is guaranteed
to have a non-negative utility (i.e., uMe (te, r−e) ≥ 0). This property will be achieved whenever there exists an ‘‘alternative’’
solution that does not use edge e, i.e., O(G− e) 6= ∅.
2. A technique for efficient truthful mechanisms
Our approach consists in defining an optimal algorithm A as a ‘‘suitable combination’’ of simpler ones. For minimization
problems, we combine algorithms by means of the following ‘MIN’ operator, which is essentially the same as the ‘MAX’
operator by Mu’Alem and Nisan [12]:
MINµ(A1, A2) operator
• compute Y1 = A1(r) and Y2 = A2(r);
• if µ(Y1, r) ≤ µ(Y2, r) then return Y1 else return Y2.
We can recursively apply this operator to several algorithms and obtain a new one:
MINµ(A1, . . . , Ak) :=MINµ(MINµ(A1, . . . , Ak−1), Ak).
Notice that the ordering among the algorithms specifies how the new algorithm breaks ties. Our main concern is to have a
general technique for building truthful mechanisms which optimize µ(·) and that are computationally efficient.
To this end, wewill assume that each algorithm Ai satisfies a property (called plateau-like) which is slightly stronger than
the one (called bitonic) used in [12]:
Definition 1 (Plateau-like Algorithm). An algorithm A for a mechanism design graph problem is monotone if, for all agents
e, and for all r−e there exists a threshold θe(r−e) ∈ (R+ ∪∞) such that (i) every x ≤ θe(r−e) is a winning declaration and
(ii) every x > θe(r−e) is not a winning declaration. A monotone algorithm A is plateau-like w.r.t. µ(·) if, for all e, for all r−e,
the function gA(x) := µ(A(x, r−e), (x, r−e)) is non-decreasing in x and constant for x > θe(r−e).
It is well known that an algorithm A can be turned into a truthful mechanism (A, P) if and only if A is monotone [13,2],
in which case the payments are uniquely2 determined by the thresholds:
Pe(x, r−e) =
{
θe(r−e) if A(x, r−e) uses e,
0 otherwise. (1)
Mu’Alem and Nisan [12] proved that, if all algorithms Ai are bitonic, then the algorithm A =MINµ(A1, . . . , Ak) is monotone,
and thus truthfulness can be guaranteed. Our main contribution here is a method for computing these payments efficiently
2 If θe(r−e) = ∞, then we can set the payment of e to be any constant value and guarantee truthfulness. This case arises if edge e will be always
included by A, e.g. forO(G− e) = ∅, in which case voluntary participation cannot be guaranteed (unless we assume an upper bound on te). Otherwise, i.e.
θe(r−e) <∞, the only payments which guarantee truthfulness are those in (1) [12] which then satisfy the voluntary participation condition.
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if we assume that the algorithms are plateau-like. This task is non-trivial since the computation of the thresholds of a ‘MIN’
combination of algorithms can be rather involved if µ(·) is not monotone increasing in x as in [12,10]:
Example 1 (Minimum Radius Spanning Tree (MRST)). Consider the problem of computing theminimum radius spanning tree,
that is, a spanning tree rooted at some node of the graphwhose height isminimal. Consider the following simple graph (left):
If Ai outputs a shortest path tree rooted at node i and h(·) denotes the height of any rooted tree, then both A := MINh(A1, A2)
and A′ := MINh(A2, A1) compute a MRST for this graph. However, the thresholds θe(r−e) and θ ′e(r−e) of the two algorithms
are different. This is due to a different tie-breaking rule: For 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, algorithms A1 and A2 have the same cost, i.e.,
gA1(x) = gA2(x); hence,
A(x, r−e) =
{
A1(x, r−e) if x ≤ 1
A2(x, r−e) otherwise
while A′(x, r−e) = A2(x, r−e). Since A2 never uses edge e, while A1 uses this edge for x ≤ 2, it turns out that θe(r−e) = 1 and
θ ′e(r−e) = 0.
Observe that, the threshold of algorithmMINh(A1, A2) is different from the thresholds of the two algorithms. Its computation
depends on the way the functions gAi cross with each other, which in general can be quite involved (we have to consider
how n ‘‘stairway’’ functions intersect pairwise [18] and the order in which we break ties). Finally, a binary search of this
threshold may require a time which depends on the edge weights (namely, the logarithm of the largest reported type) and
thus not strongly polynomial time, i.e., not polynomial in the number of nodes and edges. 
We reduce the computation of the payment Pe(x, r−e) to the task of computing, for every algorithm Ai, three thresholds
θ i = θ ie(r−e), θˆ i = θˆ ie(r−e) and θ˘ i = θ˘ ie(r−e). The value θ i is the threshold in Definition 1 relative to algorithm Ai. The other
two thresholds are defined as follows. Since Ai is plateau-like, gAi(x) = µ(Ai(x, r−e), (x, r−e)) is constant for all x > θ i,
where it also reaches its maximum. Let g i be this maximum and let gmin := mini{g i}. We let inf{∅} = ∞ and define
θˆ i, θ˘ i ∈ (R+ ∪∞) as follows:
θˆ i := inf{x| gAi(x) ≥ gmin}; (2)
θ˘ i := inf{x| gAi(x) > gmin}. (3)
Notice that the maximum g i can be easily computed knowing θi. This is the main ‘‘additional’’ feature of plateau-like
algorithms over bitonic ones. Intuitively speaking, gmin is the minimum cost if we do not use edge e. Thus, the solution
of algorithm Ai will be selected only if its cost is better/not worse than this value (depending on the used tie-breaking rule).
The two thresholds in (2) and (3) say what is the largest x for which this happens.
Our general approach for constructing computationally efficient mechanisms consists in rewriting algorithms as
suggested by the following:
Definition 2 (MIN-reducible Algorithm). An algorithm A is MIN-reducible if it can be written as the ‘MIN’ of plateau-like
algorithms. That is, there exist k algorithms A1, . . . , Ak such that A = MINµ(A1, . . . , Ak) and each algorithm Ai is plateau-like
w.r.t.µ(·). Such an algorithm A isMIN-reducible in τ time if, for every input r, it is possible to compute all thresholds θ ie(r−e),
θˆ ie(r−e) and θ˘ ie(r−e) in at most τ time steps, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and for all edges e used by A(r).
The following result provides a powerful tool for designing efficient truthful mechanisms:
Theorem 1. If algorithm A is MIN-reducible in O(τ ) time, then there exist payment functions P such that (A, P) is a truthful
mechanism and all payments Pe(x, r−e) can be computed in O(τ + k(τµ+N)) time, where τµ is the time to computeµ(·) and N
is the number of used agents/edges.
Proof. The first part of the theorem follows from a result by Mu’Alem and Nisan [12]. In order to prove the second part, we
simply show that, given the values θ i, θˆ i and θ˘ i, it is possible to compute θe(r−e) inO(k) time after the followingpreprocessing
requiring O(k · τµ) time. First of all, we compute the index imin of the first algorithm Ai such that g i = gmin. This requires
O(k ·τµ) time for computing all g i, and from that the computation of gmin and imin requires O(k) time. (Recall that g i = gAi(x)
for any x > θ i.) Then, we prove the following:
θe(r−e) = max{θ imin ,max{θˆ i| i > imin},max{θ˘ i| i < imin}}, (4)
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which we do by first proving that:
θe(r−e) ≥ θ imin (5)
θe(r−e) ≥ θ˘ i if i < imin and θ˘ i > 0 (6)
θe(r−e) ≥ θˆ i if i > imin and θˆ i > 0. (7)
If (5) would not hold, then there would exist x < θ imin such that A(x, r−e) does not use edge e and, by definition
of ‘MIN’, A(x, r−e) = Ai(x, r−e) for some i 6= imin. We can also assume w.l.o.g. that x > θ i, thus implying gA(x) =
µ(A(x, r−e), (x, r−e)) = gAi(x) = µ(Ai(x, r−e), (x, r−e)) = g i. Since θ i < θ imin , and by definition of gmin and imin,
g i > gmin = µ(Aimin(x, r−e), (x, r−e)). This contradicts the definition of ‘MIN’: for the input (x, r−e), algorithm Aimin returns
a solution of cost strictly better than that by algorithm Ai, and thus A cannot prefer Ai(x, r−e) to Aimin(x, r−e).
If (6) would not hold, then we could pick an x other than any θ l, and such that θe(r−e) < x < θ˘ i. Algorithm Ai returns a
solution of cost
µ(Ai(x, r−e), (x, r−e)) = gAi(x) ≤ gmin.
Since x > θe(r−e), algorithm A returns a solution Aj(x, r−e) which does not use edge e. This, and the fact that x 6= θ j, imply
that x > θ j. Hence the cost of this solution is µ(Aj(x, r−e), (x, r−e)) = gAj(x) = g j ≥ gmin. Inequality (5) and the definition
of ‘MIN’ imply that g j = gmin and therefore j = imin. This contradicts the definition of ‘MIN’: since i < imin = j, for the input
(x, r−e), algorithm A should prefer solution Ai(x, r−e) to solution Aj(x, r−e).
If (7) would not hold, then we could pick an x as in the previous case such that θe(r−e) < x < θˆ i. Algorithm Ai returns a
solution of cost
µ(Ai(x, r−e), (x, r−e)) = gAi(x) < gmin.
Similarly to the previous case, algorithm A returns instead a solution Aj(x, r−e) which does not use edge e. Hence,
µ(Aj(x, r−e), (x, r−e)) = gAj(x) = g j ≥ gmin. This again contradicts the definition of ‘MIN’ since algorithm A would prefer
solution Aj(x, r−e) to solution Ai(x, r−e)which has a strictly better cost.
Now, in order to prove (4), we show that one out of (5)–(7) must hold with ‘=’. By way of contradiction, assume this is
not the case. Then we could pick an x other than any θ i such that
θe(r−e) > x > θ imin (8)
θe(r−e) > x > θ˘ i if i < imin and θ˘ i > 0 (9)
θe(r−e) > x > θˆ i if i > imin and θˆ i > 0. (10)
On input (x, r−e) algorithm A returns a solution Ai(x, r−e), for some i. Inequality (8) implies that Ai(x, r−e) uses edge e and
therefore i 6= imin. If i < imin then (9) implies µ(Ai(x, r−e), (x, r−e)) = gAi(x) = g i > gmin. This contradicts the definition
of ‘MIN’ since Aimin(x, r−e) would be better. If i > imin, then (9) implies µ(Ai(x, r−e), (x, r−e)) = gAi(x) = g i ≥ gmin. In this
case, A should have preferred algorithm imin to algorithm i, because of i > imin.
Obviously, if we know θˆ i, θ˘ i and imin, then equality (4) says that a single θe(r−e) can be computed in time linear in k. From
(1) we need to compute the payments only for theN edges used in A(r). In this way, by Definition 2, the overall computation
of all such Pe(x, r−e) takes O(τ + k · τµ + k · N) time. 
3. The minimum diameter spanning tree problem
In the minimum diameter spanning tree (MDST) problem we are given a weighted undirected graph and the goal is to
find a spanning tree which minimizes the longest path between any two nodes in that tree (the length of a path is the
sum of the weights of its edges). In this section we study the corresponding mechanism design graph problem. Formally,
given a graph G = (V , E), the set O(G) of feasible solutions consists of all spanning trees; the set of used edges naturally
consists of all edges in the tree, and the goal is to find a tree T of minimum diameter, that is, a tree such that the length of a
maximum-length simple path in T is minimum. We denote this value by d(G, t). Consider the following graph:
For all te ≤ 9, any spanning tree is a MDST since, according to the edge weights t in the picture, themaximum-length simple
path is the upper one and this path appears in any spanning tree. Unfortunately, the fact that an algorithm is exact for the
MDST problem is not sufficient for obtaining a truthful mechanism. A well-known result by Myerson [13] (see also Archer
and Tardos [2]) states that, for our problem, truthfulness can be achieved only if the algorithm ismonotone (see Definition 1).
Actually, it is possible to show that exact algorithms need not lead to truthful mechanisms:
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Fact 1. Let A be an exact algorithmwhich, for the instance above, returns a tree containing edge e if and only if re ∈ [0, 5]∪[7, 9].
(We let r−e = t−e being the numbers shown in the picture.) Then there exist no payment functions P such that (A, P) is truthful
for the problem instance above.
In what follows, we will show that there exists an efficient polynomial-time algorithm for the MDST problem which
is monotone and such that the payments can be computed efficiently. Both results follow from our main technique
(Theorem 1).
3.1. A MIN-reducible algorithm for the MDST problem
The computation of a MDST of a given graph can be reduced to the computation of a shortest path tree rooted at the
absolute 1-center (simply center, in the following) of G [8]. Loosely speaking, the center of a graph is a point c located on an
edge (or on one of its endpoints) such that the distance from c to the farthest node is minimized. In particular, all edges are
rectifiable, meaning that any point c on edge f = (u, v) can be specified as a pair c = (f , λ) with λ ∈ [0, 1]; in this case,
we obtain a new graph Gc where edge (u, v) is replaced by two edges (u, c) and (v, c); their weights are uc := λte and
vc := (1 − λ)te, respectively. (Notice that we consider each edge as an ordered pair of vertices.) Given a point c on f , one
can build a spanning tree Tc of G by computing a shortest path tree of Gc rooted at c , and then by replacing edges incident
to c with the edge (u, v). Trivially, the tree Tc has diameter at most 2hλf (t).
3We let h∗f (t) be the minimum height among all
shortest paths trees rooted at some point on f , that is, h∗f (t) := minλ∈[0,1] hλf (t). Our building block is the following algorithm
which computes the relative center of edge f for the reported input r, namely, a point c = (f , λ)minimizing hλf (r):
Algorithm CENTERf
1. compute the minimum λ ∈ [0, 1] such that hλf (r) = h∗f (r);
2. compute the tree Tc for c = (f , λ) and edge weights r;
3. return Y = (Tc, c). /* return the tree Tc associated with the SPT and the center */
Since it holds that d(G, r)/2 = h∗(r) := minf h∗f (r) [8], we can compute aMDST by searching through all relative centers
of G for a best possible position of the center:
AMDST := MINh(CENTERe1 , . . . , CENTERem),
where e1, . . . , em denote the edges of G in some arbitrary order (independent of the agents’ bids). We stress that a MDST
cannot be obtained by restricting the computation of the relative center to one of the endpoints of edge f , that is, by
considering only the vertices as possible center locations. This will produce a minimum radius spanning tree, instead, and
thus the mechanism in [18] cannot be used here.
The following result, combined with Theorem 1, implies the existence of a truthful mechanism for the MDST:
Theorem 2. Algorithm AMDST is MIN-reducible and, on input a graph G with edge weights r, it returns a MDST and an absolute
center for this input. This computation requires O(mnα(n, n)) time.
Proof. In order to build a truthful mechanism out of Algorithm AMDST, we will consider a slightly more general formulation
which includes both the MDST and the absolute center problems. In particular, we consider the set O(G) as all pairs
Y = (T , c), where T is a spanning tree of G and c = (f , λ) is the position of the center, which must be located on some of
the edges in T . For any solution Y = (T , c) ∈ O(G), we let h(Y , t) be the maximum distance from c to any node in the tree
T , i.e., the height of the tree T when considering c as the root. We say that solution Y = (T , c) uses edge e if e ∈ T .
Algorithm AMDST is MIN-reducible. We need to prove that every algorithm CENTERf is plateau-like w.r.t. h(·). We first
prove that algorithm CENTERf is monotone. Consider r = (re, r−e) and r′ = (r ′e, r−e), with r ′e > re. Let Y = (T , (f , λ)) =
CENTERf (r) and Y ′ = (T ′, (f , λ′)) = CENTERf (r′). By definition, hλf (r) = h∗f (r) ≤ h∗f (r′) = hλf (r′), where the inequality
follows from the observation that h∗f (·) is monotonically non-decreasing in the edge weights. By contradiction, assume that
Y ′ uses edge e, while Y does not. Then the tree T does not contain edge e and its height remains hλf (r) also when the edge
weights are r′. Hence, h∗f (r′) ≤ hλf (r) = h∗f (r), thus implying h∗f (r) = h∗f (r′). The first step of CENTERf yields λ = λ′. Hence,
if we restrict ourselves to inputs r and r′, algorithm CENTERf returns the set of edges of a shortest path tree on Gc with
source c and edge weights r or r′. Since shortest path tree algorithms are monotone [7,10], we contradict the hypothesis
that CENTERf violates themonotonicity for inputs r and r′. To show that CENTERf is plateau-likewe observe that the function
h(CENTERf (x, r−e), (x, r−e)) = h∗f (x, r−e) is non-decreasing in x and constant for all values x for which CENTERf (x, r−e) does
not use edge e.
Correctness. On input of a graph G with edge weights r, the algorithm returns a MDST and an absolute center for this
input. The proof of this fact is due to [8].
3 Formally, the tree Tc is obtained by removing c from the shortest path tree and by adding back edge (u, v), unless c is sitting on one of the endpoints
of (u, v) and is not connected to the other endpoint.
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Complexity.We compute the distances δu,v(G, r), for all nodes u and v. Using the algorithm by Pettie and Ramachandran
[17], this step takes O(mn logα(m, n)) time. The running time then follows from this result:
Lemma 1. Given all distances δu,v(G, r), for all nodes u and v, the computations of algorithm CENTERf can be performed in
O(nα(n, n)) time.
Proof. Recall that any point on edge f is represented as pair (f , λ), with λ ∈ [0, 1]. The distance from the point (f , λ) to
another node z in (G, r) is
δ(f ,λ),z(G, r) = min{λrf + δu,z(G, r), (1− λ)rf + δv,z(G, r)}. (11)
Observe that hλf (r) = maxz∈V δ(f ,λ),z(G, r). Define functions fz(λ) := δ(f ,λ),z(G, r), for λ ∈ [0, 1]. According to the first step
of CENTERf , we have to compute the smallest λ∗ ∈ [0, 1] which is a minimum for the upper envelope of all functions in
{fz(λ)}z∈V , i.e., maxz∈V fz(λ∗) = minλ∈[0,1]maxz∈V hλf (r) = h∗f (r). Since the functions in {fz(λ)}z∈V intersect pairwise in at
most one point (see Eq. (11)), this computation requires O(nα(n, n)) time [1]. 
Since there are m algorithms, the overall complexity of AMDST is O(mnα(n, n)), which dominates the O(mn logα(m, n))
factor for the initial computations. 
We need one more step to guarantee that payments can be computed in strongly polynomial time. One of our major
technical contributions is to show that the ‘‘MIN-reduction’’ can be done efficiently:
Theorem 3. Algorithm AMDST is MIN-reducible in O(mn2 α(n, n)) time.
Proof. Wecompute the distances δu,v(G, r) and δu,v(G−e, r−e), for all nodesu and v, and for all edges eused by the computed
solution. Using the O(mn logα(m, n))-time all-pairs shortest paths algorithm by Pettie and Ramachandran [17], this step
takes O(mn2 logα(m, n)) time. (We have n graphs in total since the computed solution uses n− 1 edges.)
In the remaining of this section, we fix an edge e, and r−e, and an algorithm Ai = CENTERf , and we show how to compute
the thresholds θ ie(r−e), θˆ ie(r−e) and θ˘ ie(r−e) in O(nα(n, n)) time. This implies Theorem 3 since there arem algorithms and n
agents/edges e used by the computed solution.
At the heart of the proof is an efficient method for computing, for any edge f = (u, v), the following function in
O(nα(n, n)) time4:
Fˆ(`) := inf{x| h∗f (x, r−e) ≥ `},
which is important for us since, as we will see below, θ ie(r−e) = Fˆ(g i), θˆ ie(r−e) = Fˆ(gmin), while the other threshold can be
computed similarly.
Let δu,v(G, r) be the distance from node u to node v in a graph Gwith weights r. We consider the following function (let
inf{∅} = ∞):
fˆz(λ) := inf{x| δc,z(G, (x, r−e)) ≥ `, where c = (f , λ)}.
Is is easy to see that h∗f (x, r−e) < ` if and only if there exists a λ ∈ [0, 1] such that fˆz(λ) < ` for all z ∈ V . Conversely,
h∗f (x, r−e) ≥ ` if and only if for every λ ∈ [0, 1], there exists z ∈ V such that fˆz(λ) ≥ `. Let fˆ (·) be the lower envelope of
functions {fˆz(·)}z∈V . It then holds that Fˆ(`) = supλ∈[0,1] fˆ (λ).
We now focus on the ‘‘shape’’ of the shortest path distance from c to node z. When node e has weight x, this distance is
δc,z(G, (x, r−e)) := min{λrf + δu,z(G, (x, r−e)), (1− λ)rf + δv,z(G, (x, r−e))} (12)
which is the minimum of the following two functions:
upathλ(x) := λrf +min{x+ δu,z(G, (0, r−e)), δu,z(G− e, r−e)}; (13)
vpathλ(x) := (1− λ)rf +min{x+ δv,z(G, (0, r−e)), δv,z(G− e, r−e)}. (14)
These two functions are of the form λrf +min{x+ a, b} and (1− λ)rf +min{x+ a′, b′}, respectively (see Fig. 1(left)).
The key observation is that, in a configuration like the one in Fig. 1(left), the intersection point with the horizontal line
corresponding to ` gives a lower bound on the values x such that δc,z(x, r−e) ≥ `: the minimum of these two functions is
indeed the shortest path distance from c = (f , λ) to z and, on the right of the intersecting point, both functions are above `.
More formally, we relate fˆz(λ) to upathλ(·) and vpathλ(·) via their ‘‘inverses’’:
upath−1` (λ) := inf{x| upathλ(x) ≥ `}; vpath−1` (λ) := inf{x| vpathλ(x) ≥ `}.
It is easy to see that fˆz(λ) = max{upath−1` (λ), vpath−1` (λ)}. We then observe that these two functions can be described
by the ‘‘movement’’ of the intersection point when increasing the value of λ at unitary speed: function upathλ(x) moves
upward with speed rf and thus, as long as it intersects `, upath−1` (λ) decreases by rf (see Fig. 1(left)). For λ sufficiently large,
function upathλ(x) is fully not below ` and upath−1` (λ) = 0, while for λ sufficiently small upath−1` (λ) = ∞ since upathλ(x)
4 We tacitly assume that f is other than e, since the case in which e and f coincide can be easily handled, given that the position of the relative center
c = (f , λ) returned by CENTERf does not depend on x = rf .
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Fig. 1. From shortest path distances to upper envelopes.
is fully below `. The behavior of vpath−1` (λ) is symmetric, thus implying that fˆz(·) can be described by two segments as
shown in Fig. 1(right). (Basically, the upper envelope of the two functions.) These segments can be easily computed from
the values a b, a′ and b′ in (13) and (14). The latter can be trivially obtained from the pre-computed shortest path distances
in G−e. (E.g., δu,v(G, (0, r−e)) = δu,u′(G−e, r−e)+δv′,v(G−e, r−e), for e = (u′, v′).) Since Fˆ(`) = supλ∈[0,1] fˆ (λ), we simply
need to compute the lower envelope of the n functions fˆz which intersect pairwise in at most one point (each function fˆz
is represented by two segments as in Fig. 1(right)). This computation requires O(nα(n, n)) time once we have computed
the segments of each function [1].5 We have thus shown how to compute Fˆ(`) for each ` in O(nα(n, n)) time, after a pre-
processing for computing all-pairs shortest paths in (G, r) and in (G− e, r−e).
From the first step of CENTERf and from (2) we obtain the following two identities, respectively: (i) θ ie(r−e) =
inf{x| h∗f (x, r−e) ≥ g i} = Fˆ(g i); (ii) θˆ ie(r−e) = inf{x| h∗f (x, r−e) ≥ gmin} = Fˆ(gmin). If we replace ‘≥ `’ with ‘> `’ in
the above definitions, we obtain a function F˘(`) such that θ˘ ie(r−e) = F˘(gmin). (This will only affect whether the slanted
segments in Fig. 1(right) are left/right open/closed.)
To complete the proof we show how to compute all g i and gmin in O(mnα(n, n)) time. Observe that g i = h∗f (∞, r−e) for
Ai = CENTERf . In Lemma 1we showed that CENTERf runs in O(nα(n, n)) time if the (precomputed) distances in G are given.
WeneedO(mnα(n, n)) time to compute all g i and gmin = mini{g i}. After that, each of theO(mn) thresholds can be computed
in O(nα(n, n)) time, and the overall running time is thus O(mn2 α(n, n)), which dominates the O(mn2 logα(m, n)) factor
for the initial distance computations. 
Now observe that the time τµ to evaluate the cost (i.e., the height) of a tree is O(n), the number of algorithms in the ‘MIN’
is k = m, and the number N of agents/edges used in any solution is n− 1. Hence, Theorems 1–3 imply the following:
Corollary 1. There exists an O(mn2 α(n, n))-time truthful mechanism for the MDST problem.
4. Conclusions
Wehave described a general approach for building truthfulmechanisms running in strongly polynomial time based on the
‘MIN’ operator defined by Mu’Alem and Nisan [12]. This is similar to what Kao et al. [10] propose, though their method for
computing the payments assumes that each function gAi(x) ismonotonically increasing in x < θe(r−e) (see the assumptions
preceding Theorem 10 in [10]). For certain optimization problems, this is too restrictive, as it is the case for the MRST and
MDST, whose objective functions do not fulfill this requirement, and thus payments obtained from [10] do not guarantee
truthfulness (in Example 1, their approach would ignore the tie-breaking rule among the algorithms).
Our technique has a very natural application to the MDST problemwhere the underlying algorithm in [8] optimizing the
diameter d(·) can be rewritten as a ‘MIN’ combination ofm algorithms optimizing a different function h(·), i.e., the height of
a SPT rooted at the relative center of an edge. Quite similarly, it can be shown that for the MRST problem our method yields
a mechanism which improves the O(mn
√
n+ n3 log n) running time in [18] to O(mn√n+ n3). Besides these two problems,
we plan to apply our method to develop a strongly polynomial-time truthful mechanism for the p-center graph problem
[19] (with p fixed, since otherwise the problem is known to be NP-hard), where in addition to the location of the p centers,
one has to compute the associated trees.
Although the results have beenpresented formechanismdesign graphproblems, they apply to amore general framework
in which the agent valuations are either 0 or te, that is, to the known single minded bidders in [12] or, equivalently, to the
binary demand games in [10]. The fact that we require plateau-like algorithms (instead of bitonic ones in [12]) does not
directly prevent from optimal solutions (any bitonic algorithm minimizing the function µ(·) is automatically plateau-like).
Voluntary participation is guaranteed if optimal algorithms must drop an agent when its cost becomes too high.
An interesting future direction is to apply our technique to NP-hard problems to obtain truthful approximation
mechanisms (this was done in [10] for problems maximizing the welfare, i.e., the sum of all agents costs which obviously
meet the ‘‘monotone increasing’’ requirement). According to Theorem 1, it suffices to show that an approximation algorithm
is MIN-reducible in polynomial time. An interesting question here is whether the approximation ratio of the ‘‘best’’
approximation polynomial-time algorithm can be attained by some truthful polynomial-time mechanism.
5 The technique in [1] assumes the functions to be continuous in the interval of interest. Nevertheless, this technique can be easily adapted to piecewise
continuous functions, as those in Fig. 1(right).
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Finally, notice that our positive results cannot be extended to the case in which an agent owns several edges of a graph
(these problems can model certain scheduling problems for which no exact truthful mechanism exists [15,2], while an
extension of Theorem 1 would imply such an exact mechanism).
References
[1] P.K. Agarwal, M. Sharir, Davenport–Schinzel Sequences and their Geometric Applications, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1995.
[2] A. Archer, E. Tardos, Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents, in: Proc. of the Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computing, FOCS,
2001, pp. 482–491.
[3] E.H. Clarke, Multipart pricing of public goods, Public Choice (1971) 17–33.
[4] J. Feigenbaum, S. Shenker, Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: Recent results and future directions, in: Proceedings of the 6th Int. Workshop
on Discrete Algorithms and Methods for Mobile Computing and Communications, DIALM, ACM Press, 2002, pp. 1–13.
[5] T. Groves, Incentive in teams, Econometrica 41 (1973) 617–631.
[6] L. Gualà, G. Proietti, A truthful (2-2/k)-approximation mechanism for the Steiner tree problem with k terminals, in: Proc. of the 11th Int. Computing
and Combinatorics Conference, COCOON, in: LNCS, vol. 3595, 2005, pp. 90–400.
[7] L. Gualà, G. Proietti, Efficient truthful mechanisms for the single-source shortest paths tree problem, in: Proc. of the 11th International Euro-Par
Conference, EURO-PAR, in: LNCS, vol. 3648, 2005, pp. 941–951.
[8] R. Hassin, A. Tamir, On the minimum diameter spanning tree problem, Information Processing Letters 53 (2) (1995) 109–111.
[9] J. Hershberger, S. Suri, Vickrey prices and shortest paths: What is an edge worth?, in: Proc. of the 42nd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of
Computing, FOCS, 2001, pp. 252–259.
[10] M.-Y. Kao, X.-Y. Li, W. Wang, Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: A general framework, in: Proc. of ACM Electronic Commerce,
EC, 2005.
[11] E. Koutsoupias, C.H. Papadimitriou,Worst-case equilibria, in: Proc. of Annual Symposiumon Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, STACS, in: LNCS,
vol. 1563, 1999, pp. 404–413.
[12] A. Mu’Alem, N. Nisan, Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions, in: Proc. of 18th National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI, 2002, pp. 379–384.
[13] R. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6 (1981) 58–73.
[14] E. Nardelli, G. Proietti, P. Widmayer, Finding the most vital node of a shortest path, Theoretical Computer Science 296 (1) (2003) 167–177.
[15] N. Nisan, A. Ronen, Algorithmic mechanism design, in: Proc. of the 31st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC, 1999, pp. 129–140.
[16] C.H. Papadimitriou, Algorithms, games, and the internet, in: Proc. of Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC, 2001, pp. 749–753.
[17] S. Pettie, V. Ramachandran, Computing shortest pathswith comparisons and additions, in: Proc. of the 13th Annual ACM–SIAMSymposiumonDiscrete
Algorithms, SODA, 2002, pp. 267–276.
[18] G. Proietti, P. Widmayer, A truthful mechanism for the non-utilitarian minimum radius spanning tree problem, in: ACM Symposium on Parallel
Algorithms and Architectures, SPAA, ACM Press, 2005, pp. 195–202.
[19] B.C. Tansel, R.L. Francis, T.J. Lowe, Location on networks: A survey. Part I: The p-center and p-median problems, Management Sciences 29 (1983)
482–497.
[20] W. Vickrey, Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance (1961) 8–37.
